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Abstract: 
 
Scholars have emphasized the importance of having a “Weberian bureaucracy” for the 
socio-economic development of a country, but few attempts have been made to 
measure public administrations according to their degree of Weberianism. This paper 
presents the study and questionnaire design of a web survey covering 58 countries, 
which embodies the largest cross-national dataset on the structure of public 
administrations up to date. It also provides the main findings from the dataset: The 
features often associated with a Weberian bureaucracy can neither theoretically nor 
empirically be collapsed into a single dimension (Weberian versus a patronage-based 
administration). Instead two distinct dimensions are identified, in the paper referred to 
as professionalism (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are “professional” vis-à-vis 
“politicized”) and closedness (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are more “closed” 
or public-like vis-à-vis “open” or private-like). Finally, the paper validates these 
dimensions with information from other available data sources, and demonstrates that 
the results have not been produced by respondent perception bias. 
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Introduction 
It has been argued that state bureaucratic structures have important effects on political, 
economic, and social outcomes. Scholars in economics and sociology argue that a strong 
and well-organized state bureaucracy contributed to the economic growth in the Asian 
miracle economies of the 1990s (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; World Bank 1993) as well 
as to the economic growth more generally in semi-industrial countries (Evans and Rauch 
1999). Other scholars claim that the way the state bureaucracy is organized also 
strengthens poverty reduction in developing countries (Henderson et. al 2007). With 
reference to the rich western democracies, political scientists have long argued that the 
bureaucratic structure directly affects policymaking, both historically and today (Heclo 
1974; King and Rothstein 1993; Wier and Skocpol 1985; Marier 2005; Dahlström 
2009a). Within the field of public administration, scholars have defended the bureaucratic 
organization, warned against the effects of New Public Management reforms (Suleiman 
2003, Pollit and Bouckaert 2004) and are now predicting the “rediscovery” of 
bureaucracy (Olsen 2006). 
 
However, in spite of the attention paid to bureaucratic structures there are very few 
systematic cross-country comparisons where the organization of the state bureaucracy is 
actually incorporated. There are several reasons for this. First, the “sore point in the 
development of comparative public administration” is the lack of reliable data on 
bureaucratic structures (Brans 2003, 426; Lapuente 2007, 301). There are numerous 
cross-country indicators on the outcomes of bureaucracies, both from private 
organizations – such as the widely used Political Risk Services’ International Country 
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Risk Guide indicator of “quality of bureaucracy” – and from public ones – such as the 
encompassing World Bank’s “governance indicators”. Yet there is an almost total lack of 
cross-country datasets on bureaucratic structure. The sole exception is Peter Evans and 
James Rauch’s pioneering work. Their innovative study resulted in several seminal 
articles (see for example Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000) and a dataset 
that has extensively been used in several cross-country comparisons (see for example 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001; Henderson et al 2007). Evans and Rauch dataset has 
however some limits since it only covers 35 developing or “semi-industrialized” 
countries and focuses on the 1970-1990 period. While it provides a pioneering insight 
into the bureaucratic structures of a particular group of countries which experienced 
unprecedented growth rates with the help of autonomous bureaucracies (such as Spain, 
South Korea and other Asian “Tigers”), it remains unclear if the same results holds for 
the bureaucracies of advanced democracies, and for the East European and Post-Soviet 
states. 
 
A second reason for why we do not see more cross-country comparisons of state 
bureaucratic structures is that it is not entirely clear what should be compared. Evans and 
Rauch (1999; 2000) address – and find support for – what they call the “Weberian state 
hypothesis”. This hypothesis refers to the effect of several different Weberian 
organizational features (such as meritocratic recruitment to the state bureaucracy, 
predictable careers for bureaucrats, etc.) on economic growth and bureaucratic 
performance. However in a recent article, Johan P. Olsen (2008, 13, 25) points out that 
one of the main lessons from the “ups and downs of bureaucratic organization” is that the 
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composite nature of bureaucratic organizations makes it probable that the different 
bureaucratic dimensions change in different ways and “is not always positively 
correlated”. Olsen’s note reminds us of that even if we limit the analysis to the Weberian 
features of the bureaucracy it might very well be multidimensional. Yet we do not know 
which and how many those dimensions are. 
 
This paper addresses these two obstacles for cross-country comparisons of the state 
bureaucratic structure. First, the paper presents the Quality of Government Institute‘s 
“Quality of Government Survey”, a dataset on the structure and behavior of public 
administration based on an expert poll in 58 countries. It uses the core conceptual basis of 
Evans and Rauch’s (1999; 2000) data on Weberian bureaucracies as a theoretical tool for 
guiding data collection, but other perspectives such as New Public Management (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2004) and administrative “impartiality” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) have 
also informed the questionnaire design. The goal is to identify the most important 
structural characteristics that differentiate public administrations. Second, the paper 
disentangles the bureaucratic structure into two dimensions. The two dimensions are 
labeled bureaucratic “professionalism” and “closedness”, and they correspond with 
established classifications in the comparative administrative history (see for example 
Silberman 1993) for which no encompassing datasets exist.  
 
The main finding of the paper is that, unlike the standard view on Weberian bureaucracy, 
Weberianism should not be seen as a single dimension, but two. The paper presents both 
empirical and theoretical support for these two dimensions. These dimensions represent 
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two principal crossroads for a public bureaucracy. First, is the administration directly 
dependent on the current government (i.e. politicized) or is it more independent from the 
government and instead responsible to professional ethos and to peer-review? Second, is 
the administration similar to a standard private sector organization (e.g. regulated by 
general labor laws) or is there a distinctively public, legalistic organization isolated from 
competitive dynamics (e.g. regulated by generous specific labor laws)? The first question 
concerns the dimension of bureaucratic “professionalism” (as opposed to bureaucratic 
“politicization”) and the second to the dimension of bureaucratic “closedness” (as 
opposed to bureaucratic “openness”).  
 
Contrary to a prevalent interpretation of Weberianism, these two dimensions do not need 
to go hand in hand in the sense that a less politicized administration should also be a 
more “closed” one. A pervasive puzzling example from a comparative point of view has 
always been the case of Sweden (among other Nordic countries) whose public 
employees, despite having a very “open” public administration, are traditionally seen as 
more “professional” than “politicized”. The opposite illustration would be the highly 
“closed” public administrations one observes in many Southern European countries, such 
as Greece, Italy or Spain, where public employees enjoy extensive civil service 
protections and are regulated with specific labor laws different from those regulating their 
private-sector counterparts, but where, at the same time, politicization and patronage 
seem to play, in multitude of case-study or small-N comparisons, a more prominent role 
than professionalism. This paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
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quantitative empirical evidence supporting the notion that there are two major and 
independent clusters of Weberianist characteristics. 
 
In the remainder of the paper we first summarize the most prevailing existing efforts in 
comparative public administration to classify public bureaucracies following the concepts 
of “administrative” or “civil service” traditions and legacies. We maintain that these 
categories need to be complemented by continuous variables such as the ones collected in 
the “Quality of Government Survey”. More importantly we also provide the theoretical 
justification for focusing our analysis on the human relations features of public 
bureaucracies. Second, the paper describes the sampling frame, data collection and 
questionnaire design in some detail. Third, we analyze the multidimensionality of the 
bureaucratic structure and propose the two bureaucratic dimensions mentioned above as 
the two main ways of classifying public administrations. We assess the extent to which 
respondent characteristics predict placement of countries along these dimensions and 
validate the cross-country patterns against other available sources, including broad cross-
country datasets, few case comparisons and more in-depth case studies. In the final 
section we discuss the wider implications of this study. 
 
Key Characteristics of Bureaucratic Structures 
When it comes to measuring and classifying public bureaucracies, there are broadly 
speaking two strands in the literature. On the one hand we have economists, mostly 
focused on the “quality” of the outcomes produced by a given state apparatus. Their aim 
is to capture up to which extent a bureaucracy provides “good governance” and both the 
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theoretical concepts and the empirical measures are heavily geared towards outcomes and 
thus provide little insights when it comes to the actual characteristics of the bureaucracy 
(see for example the World Bank’s Governance Database; La Porta et al. 1999, 223; for a 
critique of this approach see Rothstein and Teorell 2008).  
 
On the other hand comparative public administration scholars have developed broad 
typologies based on theoretical concepts such as administrative legacies or civil service 
traditions (Pollit and Bouckaert 2004, Pollit et al. 2007, Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit 
2010). Most authors agree that bureaucracies structurally differ from country to country 
as a result of historical factors and that this creates stable trajectories (Barzelay and 
Gallego 2010; Painter and Peters 2010). Administrative traditions are however broad 
categories including what the political and administrative elites in a country think about 
bureaucracy, a number of bureaucratic institutional features, and the relationships 
between state and society regarding the administration of public policies (Peters 2008: 
119). The most encompassing and up to date classification of administrative traditions, 
the collective work compiled by Painter and Peters (2010), divides world bureaucracies 
into nine major administrative types: Anglo-American, Napoleonic, Germanic, 
Scandinavian, Latin American, Post-colonial South Asia and Africa, Soviet and 
Islamicist.  
 
More than the economic analysis, the administrative tradition approach provides 
important insights on the bureaucratic structure in a comparative perspective. However, 
despite its value for describing cross-country differences; there are several shortcomings 
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that justify a more continuous, quantitative classification of bureaucracies. In order to 
develop testable theories, and following Przeworski and Teune’s (1970, 25) general 
recommendation for social sciences, we maintain that comparative public administration 
should replace broad categories for explanatory variables. 
 
The important question for this paper is thus to ask which the key characteristics of 
bureaucratic structures are. Our answer is that the employment system in the public sector 
offers a useful and principally decisive way of classifying public bureaucracies in 
comparative public administration. There are several reasons for this. 
 
First, while employment relationships are at the theoretical core of the concept of 
Weberian bureaucracy, they have been empirically overlooked. In his pivotal essays, Max 
Weber gave an overwhelming importance to public staff policy. For Weber the 
interactions between rulers and their administrative and military staff were essential to 
understand a society. As emphasized by contemporary scholars, Weber’s view of 
employment relationship between rulers as employers and civil servants as employees 
anticipates many of the concerns tackled nowadays in economics under the framework of 
the principal-agent theory. One of the main drivers of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is 
the problem rulers (as principals) encounter when controlling state officials (as agents), 
because the interests of the latter often differ from the former (Lapuente 2007, 73). This 
is a classical statement of principal-agent theory: delegation of authority leads to 
problems of control due to conflicting interests of principals and agents (Kiser and Baer 
2005, 6). Weber saw an unavoidable organizational conflict within modern 
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bureaucracies: “Historical reality involves a continuous, though for the most part latent, 
conflict between chiefs and their administrative staffs for appropriation and expropriation 
in relation to one another” (Weber [1922] 1978, 264). Personnel policy is the tool for 
managing that “latent” but key bureaucratic conflict and therefore we consider it to be a 
preferential object of study.   
 
Second, numerous scholars have pointed out important variations in how public 
employment is managed. In some public administrations, ‘principals’ (i.e. political 
masters) are totally free to choose their ‘agents’ (public employees). In others, 
administrations have stringent civil service regulations or autonomous administrative 
corps that tie the hands of the ‘principals’ to choose their ‘agents’ (Lapuente 2007, 1). 
These employment systems represent “the most striking” difference between public and 
private organizations (Frant 1993, 990).  
 
That is exactly the motivation behind Evans and Rauch’s (1999) data collection effort, 
which, again, represents the clearest precedent of the dataset we present. Following 
Weber’s insight that the key for achieving good governance is replacing a patronage 
bureaucracy with a merit bureaucracy, Evans and Rauch (1999) develop the “Weberian 
state hypothesis”. They gather information on several characteristics of the employment 
system in core economic agencies. Their data collection is however guided by the idea 
that there is an underlying continuum between, on one extreme, patrimonial bureaucracy 
and, on the other, Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy. In line with this, Rauch and Evans 
(2000) build an indicator – called “Weberianness Scale” – and show how developing 
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countries scoring higher on it were growing faster in the 1970-1990 period. The 
“Weberianess Scale”, which collapses information on ten items, captures the degree to 
which bureaucracies employ meritocratic recruitment and give predictable, stable and 
rewarding long-term careers to civil servants. Despite the strength of their findings, one 
should keep in mind that data only covers 35 countries, which, in addition, are selected 
following a particular criterion. Evans and Rauch focus on 30 “semi-industrialized” 
countries – as identified previously by Chenery (1980) – and they add 5 poorer countries 
selected to increase the representation of the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. By virtue of this selection, their strong findings could be driven by the relatively 
high presence of a group of countries that are either iconic examples of Asian Tigers or 
“developmentalist dictatorships” – such as Spain, Singapore, Hong Kong or South Korea 
– and who experienced unprecedented rates of growth precisely in the 1970-1990 period. 
 
One may thus doubt to which extent the set of bureaucratic features identified in the 
“Weberianness Scale” have played the same growth-enhancing role in other parts of the 
world (e.g. advanced capitalist democracies) and during other historical periods. These 
doubts increase if we pay attention to the work of numerous administrative scholars who 
– looking at different historical periods and developing mostly small-N comparisons – 
point out an intriguing puzzle that is not captured by Evans and Rauch’s data collection. 
In principle, one should expect that those bureaucracies are more similar to standard 
private sector firms – flexible and with few legal and cumbersome constrains to hire, fire 
or promote public employees – less meritocratic, and more patrimonial than those 
bureaucracies where public employees enter the civil service via a formal examination 
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system and enjoy special protections against arbitrary actions by their (political) 
superiors, such as civil service status and the guarantee of secure tenure. In practice, the 
advancement of meritocracy does not necessarily go hand in hand with a higher 
protection of employment in the public sector. Several historical narratives on the 
transition from patronage-based or patrimonial administrations to merit-based ones 
indicate that two different types of meritocratic bureaucracies may emerge a country: one 
that we could consider more “private”, since public employees’ status is closer to that of 
their private sector counterparts, and another that we can define as more “public”, with 
over-protected public employees who are legally separated from the rest of employees in 
the country.  
 
Important administrative historians have pointed out the differences across public 
administrations of several Early Modern European countries (Finer 1997, Fischer and 
Lundgreen 1975). Britain and France represent two opposite models on how to achieve a 
meritocratic public workforce. In its state-building process, Britain did not develop an 
autonomous civil service as such (Cohen 1941, Fischer and Lundgreen 1975). The non-
formalized system of hiring and firing in the Early Modern Britain looked more like that 
of some private-sector corporations (Finer 1997). Top officials like Wolsey or Cromwell 
ran the British administration in a similar way that corporate managers run private firms 
nowadays. As Fischer and Lundgreen point out, comparatively speaking, Britain lacked 
legal regulations for public employment and “no merit system was formally established, 
but this does not mean that merit remained necessarily unrewarded” (1975, 482). Britain 
created a system of “hunting” and protection of talent, which “remained in a much more 
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fluid, adaptable state than on the Continent” (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975, 483). On the 
contrary, in France, Prussia and Spain the transformation from a patrimonial to a 
meritocratic bureaucracy entailed the development of highly legalistic civil service 
systems. Public employees started to be covered by extensive special regulations and 
grouped into autonomous and self-regulated administrative bodies, generally known as 
Corps. These bodies established formalized merit-based examinations to recruit new 
members, which were hardly disrupted by governmental or royal arbitrary interventions 
(Morstein Marx 1935, 174), and they also monopolized the management of civil servants’ 
incentives and disciplinary measures (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975). 
 
These historical differences were still present at the moment of expansion of state 
activities in Western countries during the late 19th century. In one of the most 
encompassing analysis of the evolution of bureaucratic structures at that crucial time, 
Silberman (1993) distinguishes between two different types of Weberian bureaucracies. 
Some countries, such as Japan, France, Germany or Spain developed bureaucracies with 
an ‘organizational orientation’, where public employees were not recruited for filling a 
given position or undertaking a specific task, but to generally join an organization (or 
Corps). On the contrary, public bureaucracies in countries like the US, the UK, Canada or 
Switzerland developed a ‘professional orientation’, since public employees, like the 
private-sector employees, were recruited to fill in a given job. 
 
As far as the 20th century civil service system is concerned, several authors point out that 
there is a division between  “open” civil service systems (e.g. US, UK, Netherlands) and 
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“closed” ones (e.g. France, German, Spain) (Auer at al. 1996). In the later, public 
employees join the administration through formalized civil service entry examinations, 
enjoy life tenure and are frequently managed by self-regulated autonomous 
administrative corps (Bekke and Van der Meer 2000). Those civil service systems are 
also known as the “classic administrative model” (Heady 1996). At the other end of the 
continuum we have the more “open” civil service careers systems of Sweden, the UK, 
Netherlands or Finland, where most public employees are regulated by general labour 
laws like their private-sector counterparts. Like them, they are also selected according to 
the rule of “best-suited candidate for each position” (OECD 2004, 4), instead of generally 
joining an administrative body. These systems allow more open access and life tenure is 
less frequent than in “closed” or “classical” civil service systems. 
 
In sum, scholarly studies point towards the existence and importance of the employment 
system as a key characteristic for defining public bureaucracies. These studies also show 
that the classical Weberian bureaucracy seems to be multidimensional (Olsen 2008). In 
this section we have explained why we expect at least two dimensions – in the 
introduction referred to professionalism and closedness – to occur in the data. In the next 
section we will describe the data collection and then turn to the empirical analysis of 
these dimensions.  
 
Questionnaire Design 
The general purpose of the Quality of Government Institute’s Quality of Government 
Survey (the QoG Survey for short) is as already mentioned to measure the structure and 
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behavior of public administration across countries. This survey aims at filling a gap 
between two highly dense research areas with a large variety of available indicators each. 
On the one side, we have numerous cross-country datasets on the degree of democracy 
or, generally speaking, the “input” side of the system, with well-established measures 
(see, for example, Freedom House or the Polity project). On the other side, we have also 
a large body of research on the quality of “outputs” of the system, either regarding the 
“quantity” of state activity (e.g. how generous the Welfare State is, which policies are 
provided) or the “quality” of the state (e.g. governance, state capacity). Yet, as we have 
seen in the previous section, we lack indicators on how state bureaucracies are structured 
and operate. The exact question wording and graphical layout of the questionnaire is 
provided in the Appendix. Despite being condense, the questionnaire covers a variety of 
topics which are seen as relevant to the structure and functioning of the public 
administration according to the literature, but on which we lack quantitative indicators for 
a large number of countries, such as meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion and 
career stability, salaries, impartiality, NPM reforms, effectiveness/efficiency, and 
bureaucratic representation.  
 
Three considerations motivating the questionnaire design deserve special mentioning. 
First, the questionnaire asks about perceptions rather than about statements of facts. In 
this regard, it differs from Evans and Rauch (1999; 2000) and is more in line with the 
general surge in expert polls on quality of government across the globe. Thus, for 
example, whereas Rauch and Evans (2000, 56) ask their respondents to state 
“approximately what proportion of the higher officials…enter the civil service via a 
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formal examination system”, with responses coded in percentages, we instead ask: 
“Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following 
occurs today: Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system”, with 
responses ranging from 1 (“hardly ever”) to 7 (“almost always”). The difference between 
these two question formats should not be exaggerated. At the end of the day, most of the 
questions have a factual basis in the sense that some answers for a given country are more 
correct than others. It would for example at least in principle be possible to learn how 
many public sector employees actually were hired in a country a certain year that had to 
pass a formal examination. Yet, with one noticeable exception (q6), we ask each 
respondent to translate this basic fact into a more subjectively oriented response scale. 
 
The downside of this strategy is that the subjectively defined endpoints might introduce 
bias in the country-level estimates, particularly if experts have varying standards of what 
should be considered “common” or “uncommon”. The reason we still opted for this 
strategy is twofold. First, this enables us to use the same response scale for a large 
number of “factual” questions, rather than having to tailor the response categories 
uniquely for each individual item in the questionnaire. The overarching rationale here is 
thus questionnaire efficiency: we save both space and response time by a more 
standardized question format. Second, we believe that even the most knowledgeable 
country experts are rarely in a position to correctly answer more than a handful of these 
questions with any precision. In other words, even the factual question format used by 
Rauch and Evans (2000) evokes informed guesswork on behalf of the experts. The 
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questionnaire makes this guesswork more explicit from the outset by asking about overall 
perceptions rather than “correct” answers. 
 
This of course does not imply that the questionnaire disregards the correspondence 
between respondents’ perceptions and the actual workings of the public administration 
systems they assess. We are not primarily interested in perceptions per se (although the 
data could very well be used for that purpose as well), but in the reality that underlie 
these perceptions. As indicated by the assessments of respondent perception bias reported 
below, there are few instances where personal characteristics of the experts 
systematically predict how they place their respective countries. In other words, 
subjectively defined endpoints do not appear to be a serious threat to the validity of these 
measures. Moreover, by relying on more than one expert per country, the cross-country 
descriptives reported below rely on the convergence of different expert perceptions as our 
point estimate for the actual workings of a certain country. In practice, this means relying 
on the mean estimate per country. These cross-country means are overall well correlated 
with other data sources representing the most established – although small-N – proxies 
for types of bureaucratic structure up to date. As the section on cross-source validation 
indicates, there is no obvious support for the presence of systematic measurement error in 
our data. As a matter of fact, it is quite the opposite, the data presented here seems to 
generalize for a larger and more diverse group of countries some smaller-N studies and 
impressionistic insights by administrative historians. At the same time, respondent 
disagreement within countries (i.e. the variation around the country mean) may be used 
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as an indication of the uncertainty surrounding each country estimate, thus providing a 
gauge of the extent of random measurement error.  
 
The second design issue concerns the time frame of the study. Whereas Evans and Rauch 
(2000) asked about the state of affairs prevailing over a 20-year period (1970-1990), this 
questionnaire opted for another solution: to mostly ask about the current state of affairs 
(questions q2, q4, and q6-q8), but also to ask about perceived change over the last 10-
year period for a selected set of items (questions q3 and q5). The goal of this 
retrospective approach was to at least be partially able to address the perennial issue of 
endogeneity bias when these data are to be used for explanatory purposes.  
 
The third and most pressing design issue concerns how to label and select the dramatis 
personae at center stage of the inquiry. More precisely, should one ask about the public 
administration in general or about specific sectors or agencies? And what term (in 
English) should one use to designate the persons working in the public administration in 
order to convey an equivalent meaning across countries? One initial temptation is to opt 
for the terms “civil service” and “civil servant”. Yet this is problematic since these terms 
do not even convey the same meaning in English-speaking countries across the Atlantic 
(in American English, civil servants include political appointees; in British English, they 
do not). The survey could also have been focused on a “core agency” in the public 
administration, as did Rauch and Evans (2000), but it is challenging to define what 
should be considered the “core” of a state. Recall that Rauch and Evans (2000) had a 
particular bureaucratic outcome in mind when designing their study: that of attaining 
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economic development (Evans and Rauch 1999). Our approach is more general. Apart 
from studying outcomes such as growth or economic well-being, the survey is designed 
to explore consequences for public opinion such as generalized trust and subjective well-
being. For these types of outcomes the characteristics of street-level bureaucrats could 
arguably be as important as the those of senior officials, and what specific sector or 
agency within the public administration that should matter the most cannot be easily 
settled in advance (and might very well vary between countries). Thus, we opted for a 
holistic take on the public administration, trying to gauge perceptions of its working in 
general (with one major exception: we explicitly exclude the military). 
 
After pre-testing it in a pilot, the term chosen to designate – at the most general level – 
those persons within the public administration we inquire into was public sector 
employee. This is of course a debatable solution. Most notably, there might be large 
variation across different types of public sector employees in a country, and the expert 
respondents might then run into difficulties when asked to provide one overall judgment. 
To off-set this problem somewhat, the survey contained the following clarification in the 
opening page of the questionnaire: 
 
When asking about public sector employees in this survey, we would like you to think about a typical 
person employed by the public sector in your country, excluding the military. If you think there are 
large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and 
subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service 
delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response. 
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This is of course more easily said than done, as is also indicated by the numerous 
comments on this particular issue provided by the respondents (q14). By exploring the 
consistency and face validity of the data below, however, we may conclude that this 
strategy worked more often than not. 
 
Sampling Frame and Data Collection 
After a pilot conducted in the winter of 2007-2008, the survey was administrated between 
September 2008 and May 2009 as a web survey of public administration experts in a 
wide array of countries. In order to obtain a sample of experts, we drew up a list of 
persons registered with four international networks for public administration scholars 
(NISPACEE, EGPA, EIPA, and SOG), complemented with searches on the internet, 
personal contacts, the list of experts recruited from a pilot survey, and a small 
snowballing component. All in all, this resulted in a sample of 1361 persons, of which 
528 or 39 percent responded.1 
 
The distribution of experts and the response rate across countries are provided in Table 1. 
While the number of respondents varies substantially, from only 1 for China and 
Mauritius to a maximum of 28 in the Czech Republic, on average 9.1 experts per country 
have taken the time to respond to our survey. As should be expected from the sampling 
frame, Western Europe and Northern America together with post-communist Eastern 
                                                 
1 The average response time was 17.05 minutes, or 14.51 minutes when correcting for extreme outliers. We 
contacted these persons by email, including a clickable link inside the email leading to the web-based 
questionnaire in English. The only incentives presented to participants were access to the data, a first-hand 
report, and the possibility of being invited to future conferences on the Quality of Government. 
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Europe and the former Soviet Union carry the weight of countries covered. All European 
Union member countries are covered (although with only two and one respondents for 
Malta and Luxemburg, respectively). Only seven non-Western and non-post-communist 
countries are covered by at least three respondents: India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, 
South Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, the last four of which are OECD members. By and 
large, then, our sample of countries is heavily geared towards the developed world. 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
Dimensions of Bureaucracy in the Real World 
We now turn to the key result of this web survey. To enhance data quality, this section’s 
analysis exclusively relies on the 519 respondents covering 52 countries for which at 
least 3 expert responses have been obtained (in effect excluding China, Cyprus, 
Luxemburg, Mauritius, Nigeria and Serbia & Montenegro). Given the impossibility to 
account for all bureaucratic features in a comparative study, we concentrate on what 
could be referred to as the human resources dimension(s) of a Weberian bureaucracy, 
leaving other characteristics aside. With the human resources dimension(s) we basically 
mean the recruitment, the career, and the rewarding system for state bureaucrats. It is 
important to emphasize here that, as Olsen (2008, 16-18) notes; there are several other 
characteristics of an ideal type Weberian bureaucracy such as the bureau organization, 
the hierarchical organization, and the rule-based authority. Nevertheless, following the 
theoretical reasons presented in previous sections and the empirical recommendation by 
Evans and Rauch (1999, 751), we consider staff policy or human resources to have an 
essential role for explaining bureaucratic capacity.  
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For the present purposes we have explored the eight items that, for the literature reviewed 
above, represent the main employment-related characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy. 
According to the most prevailing view (confirmed in Evans and Rauch’s 1999 dataset) 
one should expect these characteristics to go hand in hand. These items include the extent 
to which recruitment is based on merit (q2_a) and formal examinations (q2_c) rather than 
political criteria (q2_b, q2_d), as well as the extent to which promotion within the 
hierarchy is an internal affair (q2_e) and is based on lifelong career paths (q2_f). 
Competitive salaries (q2_k) and special protection from extraordinary labour laws (q8_1) 
are other components of this assemblage of features.  
 
These questions are capturing different bureaucratic characteristics, and could be seen as 
indicators of distinct bureaucratic dimensions. Table 2 reports the results from a country-
level principal components factor analysis of the above mentioned eight items. The goal 
is thus to ascertain whether a set of underlying dimensions structure the differences in 
mean responses across countries. As reported in Table 2, in a first dimension meritocratic 
recruitment and internal promotion appear to be strongly connected with a non-
politicized bureaucracy. Since these characteristics represent the ideal of a “professional” 
(vis-à-vis “politicized”) administration, we call this dimension bureaucratic 
“professionalism.” Nevertheless, not all characteristics seem to go hand in hand. 
Specifically, some features form a second empirically significant cluster. In this second 
dimension, the use of formal examination systems is intimately connected to having 
lifelong careers and protection through special employment regulations. Since this 
dimension captures the distinction between open (i.e. more “private-like”) and closed (i.e. 
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more “public-like”) civil service systems mentioned above, we call it bureaucratic 
“closedness”.  
 
*** Table 2 around here *** 
 
This allows us to see that the countries whose bureaucracies have more formal 
examination systems to join the civil service tend to also have special employment laws 
for civil servants (different from the general labor laws), who, in addition, enjoy lifelong 
careers. More interestingly, contrary to the intuitive view that a more public-oriented or 
“closed” administration would prevent politicization and enhance meritocracy, the 
analysis in Table 2 shows that the countries with more closed bureaucracies do not 
significantly have more meritocratic recruitment or less politicization of the civil service. 
The final component, competitive salaries, does not conclusively belong to either of these 
dimensions and should therefore be treated separately. 
 
Based on these results we construct two additive indices, professionalism and closedness 
which link back to the theoretical expectations described in previous sections, computed 
by averaging the respective items to which these dimensions are strongly connected.2 
Theoretically these indices may thus vary from 1 to 7, with 1 representing completely 
unprofessionalized or perfectly open systems, and 7 corresponding to a perfectly 
professionalized or closed system. The basic descriptive information on these two 
indices, together with the remaining competitive salaries indicator, is presented in Table 
                                                 
2 In addition, we have replaced missing values on individual items of the two indices by regression 
estimates based on all other items. This ensures that all 519 experts are assigned values on each index.  
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3. As can be seen, the average bureaucratic system included in this sample is deemed to 
be both more professionalized and, even clearer so, more closed than the midpoint (4) of 
the 1-7 scale. Salaries are however to a lesser degree perceived to be competitive in these 
countries.  
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
As Table 3 also indicates, however, there are large discrepancies around these means, 
both among experts assessing different countries and among those judging the same 
countries. These variations are presented in Figure 1-3, which together with the country-
specific means display 95 % confidence intervals that take the underlying within-country 
uncertainty into account.3 
 
*** Figure 1-2 around here *** 
 
In Figure 1 we find most countries belonging to the Anglo-American tradition, such as 
Ireland, New Zealand and the UK, or to the Scandinavian administrative tradition, such 
as Norway, Denmark and Sweden, at the top of the Bureaucratic Professionalism 
continuum, which is not very surprising. However, here we also find countries belonging 
to the East Asian administrative tradition, like Japan and Korea, known for having a 
strong professional bureaucracy (Painter and Peters 2010). Further down we find 
                                                 
3 Since the average sample size per country is less than 10 respondents, non-parametric bootstrapped 
confidence intervals are deemed more accurate than parametric ones based on the normality assumption. 
Bias-corrected 95 percent confidence intervals with 1000 replications on a country-by-country basis have 
been estimated in Stata 10.0 
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countries with known high levels of politicization of the civil service, such as Spain, Italy 
and, close to the bottom, Mexico (Dahlström 2009b; Matheson et al 2007). As the 
confidence intervals indicate, there is of course considerable uncertainty underlying these 
estimates. Of particular concern in this regard is Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, where the 
expert respondents are in considerable disagreement over the extent to which the public 
administration in these two countries are professionalized. The average 95 % confidence 
interval is however .97, almost exactly the magnitude of the cross-country standard 
deviation. The ratio of the between- over the within-country variation, moreover, is 
approximately 1.22. Despite expert uncertainty, and in some cases small country samples, 
we would thus argue that these data give meaningful estimates of the level of 
professionalization across countries. 
 
Figure 2 captures how “closed” civil service systems are, and, again, the ranking seems to 
correspond with established observations in the small-N studies surveyed above. Near the 
top are Spain, France and Japan, countries that already in the historical analysis of public 
administrations in the 19th century have been pointed out as the clearest examples of 
bureaucracies with “organizational orientation” (Silberman 1993, 12), in opposition to the 
ones with “professional orientation.” Those countries (together with other such as 
Greece, Korea or Belgium) also rank at the top in more contemporary accounts of closed 
administrations, both by scholars and international organizations (Schnapp 2001, OECD 
2004, Lapuente 2007). At the bottom of the ranking, we find, first of all, the countries 
regarded in those accounts as more “open” (or more professional or private-sector 
oriented), such as New Zealand, Australia, Denmark or the Netherlands. These countries 
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lack the formal examinations more “closed” bureaucracies have (e.g. French concours or 
Spanish oposiciones) as well as their guarantees of lifelong tenure and other civil service 
protections established in special employment laws. Secondly, at the bottom of the 
bureaucratic closedness scale we see a very different group of countries – such as South 
Africa, Belarus, Georgia or Russia – that were also at the bottom in terms of bureaucratic 
professionalism given their high levels of politicization and low levels or meritocracy.  In 
other words, being at the bottom of this scale, because you have a more open or private-
oriented approach to public employment, does not lead you to have a less (or more) 
meritocratic bureaucracy.  
 
Again these point estimates are surrounded by perception uncertainty, actually even more 
so than in the case of professionalization. The average 95 % confidence interval is here 
1.11, and the between/within-country variation ratio only .92. Countries of considerable 
concern are Uzbekistan, where the uncertainty bounds are so wide as to render any 
meaningful inference almost impossible, but also South Africa, Kazakhstan and Malta, in 
the latter case by and large due to the small number of expert respondents. Although this 
warrants caution for potential data users, the cross-country patterns are nevertheless 
sensible enough to suggest that these data tap into another structural difference among 
bureaucratic systems. 
 
*** Figure 3 around here *** 
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The main findings of the paper can be graphically summarized in Figure 3, which plots 
the 52 countries analyzed according to their degree of “professionalism” and 
“closedness.” Unlike the usual unidimensional accounts of bureaucracies (i.e. patronage-
based vs. merit-based), we see here how four different types of bureaucracies emerge. 
Among the more “open” (or more “private”), there are both patronage-based (e.g. South 
Africa, Georgia) as well as the top performers in merit (e.g. New Zealand, Denmark). 
And among the more “closed” or “public” there are some relatively meritocratic (e.g. 
India, Japan, France), but there are also some with relatively high levels of politicization 
and lack of merit (e.g. Greece, Italy). In other words, having a more “public” bureaucratic 
employment system does not mean having a more meritocratic bureaucracy. These 
findings can have important normative implications for policymakers interested in 
developing more meritocratic bureaucracies.   
 
Cross-Source Validation 
This section checks the robustness of the two dimensions just discussed, using four 
different proxies from various sources. We first report these tests as correlations in Table 
4. The first source of validation is an expert survey on the number of politically appointed 
officials in the central government offices from 18 countries conducted by Dahlström 
(2009b). Between two and four highly qualified country experts, all of whom were 
identified on the basis of their publication record in public administration, were by email 
asked to provide an estimate of this number. This survey is thus similar to ours in terms 
of the sample of experts (although the sample size per country is more narrow), but 
instead of using a subjectively defined response scale, exact, and thus more objective 
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statements of facts, were solicited. We have taken the log of this figure to smooth out 
country outliers, the expectation of course being that more professionalized systems 
should have fewer appointees. The degree to which a bureaucratic system is open or 
closed, on the other hand, is not expected to be correlated with this number.  
 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
 
The second source reported in Table 4 is the scale of “Bureaucracy quality”, ranging 
from 1 to 4, as reported by the Political Risk Services group’s “International Credit Risk 
guide” in 2008, the latest year available (ICRG 2009). The ICRG staff produces a 
subjective assessment based on available political information from 143 countries in the 
world, 47 of which overlap with our country sample. According to their definition of 
“Bureaucracy quality”: 
 
high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk 
countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a 
strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in 
terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions (ICRG 2009, p. 7). 
 
We should thus expect also this assessment to be correlated with the professionalism 
index, but not with bureaucratic closedness. 
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The third and fourth source have instead been intentionally selected to correspond to the 
open-closed dimension. Data for both have been collected by the OECD through a survey 
filled in by senior officials from ministries/agencies for public employment/management 
of the civil service (OECD 2009). The underlying data are thus again subjective 
perceptions, but now from the viewpoint of civil servants themselves rather than from 
outside experts. The first is the “Index of Recruitment Systems”, which theoretically 
varies from 0 (“Career-based system” –i.e. “closed”) to 1 (“Position-based system” – i.e. 
“open”). This index is constructed from four questions, two of which tap in to the use of 
competitive examinations vs. direct applications in the recruitment process, and one of 
which concerns the extent to which positions in the civil service are open to external 
recruitment or not. These features thus closely correspond to our theoretical distinction 
between open and closed bureaucracies. 
 
The fourth (and second OECD) source is a measure of the “degree of individualization”, 
which denotes “the degree to which the management rules and practices vary according 
to the individuals and less according to the group” (OECD 2004, 17). This is a measure 
traditionally associated with the closedness of a bureaucracy. In those systems defined as 
closed, public, organizationally-oriented or career-based, candidates join the civil service 
in relatively large-scale job competitions, their salaries and employment conditions are 
collectively bargained and their promotions collectively regulated and granted. In simple 
words, civil servants are, first and foremost, treated as members of a collective. On the 
contrary, in those systems known as open, private, professionally-oriented or position-
based, candidates (like their private sector counterparts) are recruited to fill a particular 
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position, and their salaries and employment conditions are more likely to be set on an 
individual basis. 
 
As Table 4 makes clear, these expectations are well borne out. Among the 18 countries 
for which there are overlapping observations, the professionalism index is negatively 
correlated with the number of appointees (at –.67), whereas the association with the 
closedness index at .36 is not statistically significant. Moreover, ICRG:s “bureaucracy 
quality” is reasonably well correlated with professionalism (at .71), but completely 
unrelated to closedness. By contrast, the two OECD indices are most closely related to 
closedness (with correlations at –.69 and –.58), but their relationships with 
professionalism are weak and not statistically significant. 
 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
 
Figures 4a-5b offer a graphic visualization of the cross-national patterns producing these 
relationships. All in all, one can see how, despite using varying response scales, expert 
selection criteria, and types of experts, measures of similar features of the bureaucratic 
structure produce fairly consistent results. Therefore we believe these cross-source 
correlations strengthen our confidence in the validity of both the professionalism and 
closedness dimensions. 
 
*** Figures 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b about here *** 
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Assessing Respondent Perception Bias 
All expert respondents taking part in the survey are of course not of one and the same 
kind. The average respondent in our sample of 52 countries with at least 3 respondents is 
a male (66 %), 47-year-old PhD (82 %), an overwhelming majority of which were either 
born (90 %) or live (92 %) in the country for which they have provided their responses. 
Do these expert characteristics somehow affect perceptions of bureaucratic structures? If 
perceptions vary systematically by observable expert characteristics, the extent to which 
they reflect a common underlying reality would be in doubt. That would for example 
imply that the estimate for a particular country is determined by the make-up of the 
sample of experts rather than by its bureaucratic structure or practices. 
 
To assess the risk of such perception bias, we have in Table 5 regressed the two 
dimensions of bureaucracy on all five expert characteristics for which we have data. At 
first, there seems to be two systematic tendencies in the data. Both these tendencies 
appear in the upper panel of the table. The first is that female experts (which make up a 
third of the sample) perceive their bureaucracies to be somewhat less professionalized 
and somewhat more open than their male counterparts (although the latter tendency is 
only marginally significant). Moreover, younger experts perceive bureaucracies to be 
both less professionalized and more closed.  
 
*** Table 5 about here *** 
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These tendencies could however simply reflect the fact that the female and younger 
experts are overrepresented in countries whose bureaucracies differ systematically on 
these dimensions. In other words, we would preferably want to assess differences in 
perceptions across different types of experts while holding the object of evaluation (i.e. 
the bureaucracy of a specific country) constant. In the lower panel of Table 5, we 
accomplish this by exclusively relying on the within-country variation among experts (in 
technical terms, we control for country-fixed effects). With this control in place, as can 
be seen, both the gender and age biases disappear. There is thus no systematic tendency 
among either female or younger expert to perceive bureaucracies differently when asked 
about the same bureaucracy. However, another systematic tendency now appears, 
namely that respondents assessing countries in which they do not live perceive 
bureaucracies to be less professionalized and more open (as compared to experts living in 
the country they assess). Thus, once cross-country variation is being controlled for, 
respondents not living in the country they assess rate the bureaucracies .385 points lower 
than resident respondents on the 1–7 professionalism scale, and .349 lower on the 1-7 
closedness index (although the latter difference is only marginally significant).  
 
There is no obvious explanation as to why these differences in perception between 
resident and non-resident respondents appear. Although we must acknowledge that this 
systematic difference appears in the data, it is at the same time not very large in absolute 
terms. When it comes to relative differences in country scores, moreover, the results we 
obtain from these two types of experts for the 25 countries where we have at least one 
point estimate from each of them are very similar. For the professionalization index, the 
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scores from resident and non-resident experts correlate at .76, for bureaucratic closedness 
at .77; and it should then be remembered that the point estimates from non-respondents 
are in most instances (19 of the 25 countries) based on only one expert. By and large 
then, whereas this source of perception bias introduces some extra noise in our data, it is 
not serious enough to question the overall validity of the dimensions of bureaucracy. 
 
Conclusions 
The field of comparative public administration has always had great thinkers. Not only 
from Max Weber and onwards, but as Raadschelders’ (1998, 45) review of comparative 
administrative scholars shows it also includes classical writings from Herodotus, 
Aristotle or Ibn Khaldun. However, to a large extent the field lacks comparative data on 
many of its key variables which, of course, hampers empirical analyses. This paper has 
presented a unique attempt to provide such data on several relevant administrative 
features for a large number of countries. This data will in the future hopefully help to 
explain differences in bureaucratic performance, state capacity and social outcomes such 
as corruption and economic growth.  
 
 
The paper makes both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. Drawing on the work 
of administrative historians, we argue that already on theoretical grounds one should 
expect several dimensions in a Weberian bureaucracy. The main contribution of the paper 
is however empirical and we demonstrate that, unlike the prevailing view (e.g. Evans and 
Rauch 1999), bureaucratic features do not follow a single continuum, but rather two 
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distinctive dimensions. In this paper we refer to the two dimensions as bureaucratic 
professionalism (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are “professional” vis-à-vis 
“politicized”) and bureaucratic closedness (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are more 
“closed” or public-like vis-à-vis “open” or private-like). By way of validating these 
dimensions against other independent data sources and demonstrating that the results 
have not been produced by respondent perception bias the paper secures data quality and 
points to the significance of the results. 
 
The normative implications of this finding are also very relevant. Institutional designers 
and policymakers interested in creating meritocratic bureaucracies tend to follow the 
standard view of Weberianism as a highly regulated bureaucracy where civil servants, in 
order to be protected from politicians’ interferences, must enjoy civil service status, have 
special protections and specific labor laws different to those applied in the private sector. 
However, in the light of the evidence presented here, those measures are not correlated 
with a more meritocratic or less politicized administration. In order to protect 
professional merit from arbitrary political assaults, it does not seem necessary to isolate 
public employees from the working conditions of the private sector. A professional 
bureaucracy seems to be compatible with a higher degree of flexibility than has 
previously been recognized. 
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Appendix: The Questionnaire 
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Table 1. Number of Valid Responses by Country 
Country Respondents  Country Respondents 
Albania 11  South Korea 7 
Armenia 16  Kyrgyzstan 6 
Australia 10  Latvia 7 
Austria 5  Lithuania 11 
Azerbaijan 6  Luxembourg 1 
Belarus 9  Macedonia 7 
Belgium 7  Malta 4 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 7  Mauritius 1 
Brazil 3  Mexico 11 
Bulgaria 22  Netherlands 14 
Canada 13  New Zealand 12 
China 1  Nigeria 2 
Croatia 6  Norway 12 
Cyprus 2  Poland 11 
Czech Republic 28  Portugal 9 
Denmark 13  Romania 17 
Estonia 10  Russian Federation 6 
Finland 11  Serbia & Montenegro 2 
France 6  Slovakia 7 
Georgia 8  Slovenia 11 
Germany 12  South Africa 4 
Greece 22  Spain 7 
Hungary 15  Sweden 10 
Iceland 4  Switzerland 5 
India 7  Turkey 5 
Ireland 16  Ukraine 11 
Italy 7  United Kingdom 11 
Japan 9  United States 19 
Kazakhstan 7  Uzbekistan 3 
   TOTAL 528 
Note: Countries in italics are not included in this paper due to too low response rate. 
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Table 2. Dimensions of Bureaucracy. 
 Professionalism Closedness Salaries 
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)   .90 –.10 .03 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.93   .09 –.13 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.82 –.17 –.04 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)   .82   .18 –.16 
Formal examination system (q2_c)   .03   .89 –.01 
Lifelong careers (q2_f)   .38   .67 –.42 
Special employment laws (q8_f) –.24   .75 –.12 
Competitive salaries (q2_k)   .08 –.10 .96 
Note: Entries are varimax rotated factor loadings for the first three factors retained from a 
principal components factor analysis at the country level (n=52). Loadings >.5 or <–.5 
are highlighted in bold, questionnaire items (see the Appendix) within parentheses. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Characteristics of Three Dimensions of Bureaucracy. 
  
Individual-
level mean 
 
Country-
level mean 
Cross-
country 
standard 
deviation 
Within-
country 
standard 
deviation 
Ratio 
 cross- over 
within 
variation  
Professionalization 4.25 4.22 0.99 0.81 1.22 
      
Closedness 4.99 5.00 0.81 0.88 0.92 
      
Salaries 3.37 3.34 1.10 1.43 0.77 
      
Note: Each dimension may theoretically vary from 1 to 7. The individual-means and 
within-country standard deviation is based on 519 respondents for professionalization and 
closedness, 514 for salaries. The country-level means and cross-country standard 
deviations are based on 52 countries. 
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Table 4. Tests of Cross-Source Validity. 
 Professionalism Closedness 
Log of no. of political appointees –.67*** .36 
 (18) (18) 
Bureaucracy quality (ICRG) .71*** –.00 
 (47) (47) 
Index of recruitment system (OECD)  .09 –.69*** 
 (25) (25) 
Degree of individualization (OECD) .32 -.58*** 
 (28) (28) 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients, with number of countries within parentheses. 
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Table 5. Respondent Perception Bias. 
 Professionalism Closedness 
A. OLS   
Female –.309** –.207* 
PhD .167 .244* 
Year of Birth –.016*** .017*** 
Was Not Born in Country .205 –.017 
Does Not Live in Country –.195 –.153 
   
B. Country-Fixed Effects   
Female –.053 –.142 
PhD –.210* .137 
Year of Birth –.000 .006 
Was Not Born in Country –.050 .149 
Does Not Live in Country –.385** –.349* 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. No. of observations is 490 for 
professionalism and closedness, 477 for salaries. No. of countries is 52. 
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Figure 1. Bureaucratic Professionalism (country means with 95 % confidence intervals) 
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Figure 2. Bureaucratic Closedness (country means with 95 % confidence intervals) 
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Figure 3. Bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness. 
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Figure 4a. Professionalism and the number of political appointees (n=18) 
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Figure 4b. Professionalism and bureaucracy quality (n=47) 
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Figure 5a. Closedness and recruitment systems (n=25) 
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Figure 5a. Closedness and degree of individualization (n=28) 
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